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At a military base outside Phnom Penh, two elderly defendants have been refusing since October 
2014 to cooperate in the second stage of their trial for presiding over mass killings during the 
1975±79 Khmer Rouge regime. A third defendant died in early 2013, a few months after a fourth 
was ruled unfit to be tried. So far only one case at the Tribunal has run its full course, that of a 
former torture center chief who is currently serving a life sentence. Cambodia¶VDXWKRULWDULDQ 
government (it has long been rated Not Free by Freedom House) is blocking any further arrests, 
and the US$200 million that the international community has spent so far on a flawed ³hybrid´ 
tribunal (it is considered both Cambodian and international) will probably result in just three 
convictions.  
Next door in Thailand, the Truth for Reconciliation Commission that was set up to 
investigate the deaths of 92 people during April and May 2010 demonstrations has failed to offer 
any strong criticism of the military officers who ordered most of the killings. Instead, the 
commission has blamed armed elements within protest ranks for precipitating the violence. The 
Royal Thai Army, its longstanding impunity unchecked, went  on to stage yet another coup 
7KDLODQG¶VWZHOIWKVLQFHin May 2014.  
2YHUWKHSDVWWZRGHFDGHV³Wransitional justice´²a catch-all phrase that refers both to 
truth commissions such as the one in Thailand and special courts with criminal-sentencing 
powers such as the one in Cambodia²has become a vast global industry that employs tens of 
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thousands of people. Kathryn Sikkink lists transitional human-rights prosecutions relating to 48 
countries, mainly since the mid-1990s, along with 28 truth commissions.1 Much of the funding 
for these activities comes via the United Nations, or as donations from Western countries and 
Japan. In 2014, the UN spent more than $200 million on the Rwandan and former Yugoslavia 
tribunals alone. Like any such industry, the transitional-justice enterprise has promoters who 
make optimistic claims about what it is and what it can accomplish.2 Two key milestones mark 
the rise of transitional justice7KHILUVWZDVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI6RXWK$IULFD¶V
postapartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the second was the creation in 
2002 of the International Criminal Court (ICC), with its headquarters at The Hague. These two 
institutions have served as oft-imitated models, while the principles and ideals that they are 
meant to embody have been widely praised and exported.  
The ICC symbolizes the idea that those responsible for genocide, war crimes, or other 
crimes against humanity should face trial, not simply in normal domestic courts²which often 
are too limited in capacity or too politicized to act against political elites or senior security 
officials²but in specially created international tribunals. By trying these defendants outside 
ordinary courts and under the highest international standards of justice, such tribunals are meant 
to exert a potent moral authority that will deter current and future leaders from engaging in 
terrible criminal acts. These WULEXQDOV¶ZDUPHVW supporters also claim that the principles thus 
demonstrated can help to improve local judicial systems while also laying some of the 
groundwork for transitions toward more open and democratic political orders. 
The South African TRC captured the notion that a transition to democracy must often 
confront ³unfinished business´: histories of human-rights abuses, crimes committed by former 
regimes, and violent incidents that have gone uninvestigated, sometimes for decades. In many 
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cases, pressing criminal charges against perpetrators (who may also be victims) proves 
impractical or undesirable. Truth commissions offer a less adversarial means of righting wrongs. 
Documents and other evidence are collected, witnesses are interviewed, reports are published²
but legal immunity is often given, and generally nobody goes to jail. This nonpunitive, quasi-
judicial process aims to heal emotional wounds and promote comity between old enemies.  
The current vogue for transitional justice seems, on its face, eminently reasonable and 
indeed laudable. Those who have committed atrocities or crimes against humanity deserve to be 
tried and (if convicted) punished, by an international tribunal if necessary. Societies torn by 
violence should have a chance to remember, reflect, and pursue reconciliation. The rise of 
transitional justice has given rise to a huge industry of lawyers, UN staff, NGO activists, 
consultants, and fellow-traveling academics who are busy setting up tribunals and truth 
commissions around the world. And always, of course, all is done in close collaboration with 
local ³partners.´ A main argument of the industry is that it helps to create ³justice cascades´ 
through which norms of fair trials and accountability begin to take hold in national and local 
contexts. 
Accountability is an important concept. As Ricardo Blaug argues, it has two core 
components. The first is scrutiny (who can be made to explain their actions?), and the second is 
sanction (what consequences will they face?).3 While truth commissions emphasize scrutiny, 
trials emphasize sanction. Evaluating the success of accountability involves establishing criteria 
for the effectiveness of transitional-justice initiatives. Much depends on the aims that the 
mechanisms are meant to serve. These aims may not always be obvious: They could include 
punishing criminality, asserting morality, creating an ³expressive´ example, resolving conflicts, 
DLGLQJSROLWLFDO³WUDQVLWLRQV,´achievLQJ³FORVXUH,´HQKDQFLQJ³WUDQVSDUHQF\´and community 
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cohesion, or crafting historical memory. Some of these aims may contradict one another. In some 
cases, for instance, transitional-justice mechanisms may end up preventing scrutiny²key actors 
may never testify, commission reports may become exercises in evasion²or they may even 
obstruct rather than promote the imposition of effective sanctions. 
Transitional justice, whether brought by tribunal or truth commission, would be great if it 
worked. Likewise, if its results were unproven but fairly harmless, there would be little to worry 
about. Money has often been wasted on much worse things. But what if transitional justice all 
too often proves counterproductive? What if it raises unrealistic hopes, stirs up fears and hatreds, 
hijacks transition processes, and even strengthens corrupt elites? If the transitional-justice 
industry spawns new nightmares instead of banishing old ones, then the tribunals and 
commissions have gone too far.  
Another oft-heard term in the transitional-justice world is ³KROLVWLFDSSURDFK´7KHLGHDLV
that criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, gender justice, security-sector reform, 
and efforts to memorialize victims should often be deployed together. Nevertheless, the 
syncretism involved in such complementarity is analytically quite confused. Throwing in, for 
example, promoting more enlightened gender policies and cutting the number of army generals 
serves to blur the legalistic character of transitional justice²since these are policy measures that 
can be undertaken by any society.  
 
Tribunals on Trial 
 
The idea of charging people with crimes against humanity in international courts goes 
back to the tribunals convened by the victors at the end of the Second World War. As was 
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recognized at the time, it implied no sympathy for the Nazis to point out that the retrospective 
legal basis on which they were tried was extremely problematic. Radhabinod Pal, the dissenting 
Indian judge at the Tokyo war-crimes trials (1946±48), condemned that process as a ³YLFWRU¶V
charter.´4 Although Pal was moved by his personal hostility to Western imperialism, his closely 
reasoned dissent became a landmark in international law, making the case for an ³even justice´5 
grounded in an international ³impartial court´ with universal jurisdiction. Pal praised moves 
dating back to a 1920 meeting at The Hague to create an International Court of Criminal Justice, 
hailing it as a ³wise solution to the problem.´  
By excluding from the dock Allied leaders themselves (who might have been arraigned 
for the mass bombing of civilians) as well as Emperor Hirohito and his relatives (who were 
exempted from prosecution by wary occupation authorities), the Tokyo Tribunal proved highly 
selective in its choice of targets. Telford Taylor, one of the U.S. Nuremberg prosecutors, saw the 
dangers of selectivity and called upon the United States and other leading nations to create a 
³permanent international penal jurisdiction´ in order to avoid the German perception that 
Nuremberg ³was for Germans only.´6  
Does the ICC, which was finally brought into being by the Rome Statute of  2002, fulfill 
3DO¶VKRSHIRU³even justice,´ or does it continue the Nuremburg tradition of ³expressive´ 
trials²procedures legal in form, but with questionable OHJDOEDVHVWKDWDUHKHOGIRU³KLJKHU´
emotional or moral reasons? And do ³H[SUHVVLYH´WULDOVnot drift perilously close to becoming 
show trials? Is the ICC supporting international norms and values, or has it come to serve mainly 
the interests of Western powers? How far is the broader rise of international tribunals, 
symbolized by the ICC, helping to promote liberal notions of justice? And is there a risk that the 
proliferation of such tribunals could perversely end up undermining the promotion of justice?  
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Housed at The Hague, the ICC currently has 122 state parties, while a further 31 
countries have signed the Rome Statute without ratifying it. A novel feature of the Rome Statute 
is that the ICC can act without the authorization of the UN Security Council or any particular 
state; rather, the ICC is deemed to create a parallel form of jurisdiction which is said to 
³complement´ that of the nation-state.  
To date, the ICC has DFWHGZLWKUHJDUGWRHLJKW³VLWXDWLRQV´RSHQLQJFDVHVDQG
indicting 36 people. Of those, it has so far convicted just two, while spending a growing budget 
that in 2009 alone added up to almost $PLOOLRQDOORILWFRQWULEXWHGE\WKHFRXUW¶V³VWDWH
SDUWLHV´ Although preliminary proceedings have begun in cases from Afghanistan, Colombia, 
Georgia, Honduras, Ukraine, and Venezuela, all those indicted so far have been African, as have 
been both of those convicted (they are from the Democratic Republic of Congo). This record has 
caused the African Union to threaten mass withdrawal from the Rome Statute, and to demand 
that serving heads of state be exempted from ICC indictment while in office.  
Two major ICC debacles stand out. The first was its ineffectual 2008 indictment of 
Sudan¶V3resident Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity in relation to Darfur. A defiant 
Bashir retains his post and travels the region with no fear of arrest. The second was the 
December 2014 decision by WKHFRXUW¶Vchief prosecutor to drop a case against Kenyan president 
Uhuru Kenyatta for fomenting 2007 postelection ethnic violence. Kenya, an ICC state party, had 
covertly sabotaged the investigation.7 The ICC¶VOLPLWVLQGHDOLQJZLWKVLWWLQJheads of state and 
ongoing conflicts are painfully clear, and raise the question of how a transitional-justice model 
can work when there has been no real transition. 
China, India, Israel, Russia, and the United States are all nonparties to the ICC, and the 
Arab states (except Jordan) have stayed out as well. The United States, critics charge, prefers 
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special UN-sponsored tribunals, such as those that the Security Council set up to deal with 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, to the more freewheeling ICC. Although the United States 
has refused to ratify the Rome Statute, since 2005 it has shifted from an adversarial position and 
begun working as an ally of the ICC, leading detractors to charge that the court has become ³an 
instrument in the toolkit of major powers responding to instability and violence in weaker 
states.´8 Thus has an institution founded to pursue impartial justice become a means of managing 
political problems XQGHUWKHUXEULFRILPSDUWLDOMXVWLFH¶VPRUDODXWKRULW\ If this is how the 
flagship project of ³transitional justice´ operates, then we might wonder if the adjective²which 
refers to the political project of promoting certain kinds of regimes over others²outweighs the 
noun.  
The ,&&¶Vrecent travails underline Victor Peskin¶VLGHDWKDWcourtroom trials run parallel 
with²and may be overshadowed by²³virtual trials,´which are in fact political struggles 
between the international community and the states where war crimes took place, as well as 
factional fights within those states. Virtual trials often loom large because international tribunals 
so frequently represent attempts to lay a scrim of morally superior judicial ritual atop stubborn, 
messy political realities. Simply put, international tribunals have been created to solve political 
problems that lie well beyond their capacity to fix. What is needed instead is not more tribunals, 
but rather more scope for creative political fixes of the sort that legal experts are unlikely ever to 
generate.  
Peskin concludes that tribunals (often meaning their chief prosecutors) have sometimes 
been able to win greater cooperation from targeted states through the use of strategies ³ranging 
from shaming to negotiation.´9 In other words, a tribunal¶s ability to deliver justice hinges on 
how politically skilled its leadership is. If chief prosecutors closet themselves with piles of 
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documents, their courts are likely to fail. Peskin argues that such prosecutors must be good at 
conciliation and deal-making, even if this risks the appearance of ³an exercise that has more to 
do with politics than with law.´10 In the end, tribunals and truth commissions are quasi-legal 
processes that have as their goal a stable and fair political settlement. Former International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda legal advisor Kingsley Chiedu Moghala¶VH[WHQVive research 
leads him to argue that ³using international war crimes trials as a frontline approach to 
preventing or deterring genocide is a failing policy.´11 Since all supranational transitional justice 
arrangements are essentially political, they lack the legitimacy to effect real change.  
 
Replacing Politics with Legalism 
 
 In addition to the paucity of evidence that transitional-justice solutions are effective, there 
is the problem that the entire transitional-justice edifice²whether in its tribunal or its truth-
commission form²rests on dubious claims of moral superiority that are used to trump all 
criticism RIWUDQVLWLRQDOMXVWLFH¶VXQGHUO\LQJLGHRORJLFDOSURMHFWZKLFKLVWRUHSODFHSROLWLFVZLWK
legalism.12  
The matter was set forth most clearly a half-century ago in a seminal book by the political 
theorist Judith N. Shklar.13 A Harvard academic who as a child fled to North America 
from her native Latvia in order to escape the Nazis, Shklar was deeply skeptical about the 
ethical underpinnings of the Nuremburg trials. She became convinced that those who 
sought to emphasize the priority of justice over politics were quietly subscribing to an 
ideology²almost always kept implicit²that she called ³legalism.´ Advocates of 
legalism liked to insist that the pursuit of justice was somehow suprapolitical and even 
beyond criticism. Contending that legalism does not stop at  merely separating law from 
politics Shklar charged that legalism looks down on politics 14  
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The divorce of law from politics is, to be sure, designed to prevent arbitrariness, 
and that is why there is so little argument about its necessity. However, 
ideologically legalism does not stop there. Politics is regarded as not only 
something apart from law, but as inferior to law. Law aims at justice, while 
politics looks only to expediency. The former is neutral and objective, the latter 
the uncontrolled child of competing interests and ideology. Justice is thus not the 
policy of legalism, it is treated as a policy superior to and unlike any other.15  
Shklar set out to make a countercase for the indispensability of politics. Only by 
engaging in the give-and-take of sharing and competing for power, she insisted, can a society 
thrash out its conflicts and disagreements. Political problems need political solutions. Yet once 
the ³crimes against humanity´ designation is applied, such solutions are displaced by legalistic 
steps that invoke the rhetoric of ³justice´ZKLOHIDLOLQJWRVROYHWKHirreducibly political problems 
that troubled societies continue to face. 
In a 1986 preface to the second edition of her book, Shklar noted that the original edition 
had ³offended virtually all of the lawyers who read it´by treating legalism as a political 
ideology. Most of them much preferred to assume that legal ideas and institutions are ³highly 
discrete practices´ immune from politics. Although the questioning of such assumptions has 
become more common VLQFH6KNODU¶VWLPHWKHSUREOHPof regarding law as morally superior to 
mere politics persists²and is particularly acute in the world of transitional justice. Shklar 
observed that legalism reveals itself most clearly ³at the margins of normality,´ as in the 
Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals, and noted with some apparent satisfaction: ³There have been 
many wars since then and endless crimes against humanity, but there has been no repetition of 
the trials that followed the Second World War.´16  
Shklar saw Nuremburg as a broadly successful intervention, but largely because the 
tribunal formed part of a clear and well-crafted political project, and was hence far more than a 
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legalistic exercise. She seemed to view the lack of new international tribunals up to 1986 as 
betokening a grasp of their shortcomings and hence vindicating her arguments. She died in 1992, 
before the vogue for transitional justice that came on the heels of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, and would later produce the ICC.  
What would Shklar have made of this vogue? Her 1986 preface includes an important 
defense of something she calls ³tribunality´%\WKLV, she means that law is an extension of 
politics, rather than a moral high ground towering somewhere above political life. Tribunality, 
says Shklar, LV³inherent in functioning assemblies, bureaucracies, mediators of all kinds and 
H[WHQGVHYHQGRZQWRSDUHQWVDVWKH\WU\WREHIDLULQGLVWULEXWLQJUHZDUGVDQGSHQDOWLHV¶17  
6KNODU¶VVXSSRUWIRUWKHFUHDWLYHOHJDOLVPIRXQGDW1XUHPEXUJZKLFKFDQEHMXVWLILHGµDV
DQDFWRIOHJDOLVWLFVWDWHVPDQVKLSDQGRQWKHEDVLVRILWVLPPHGLDWHHIIHFWVRQ*HUPDQSROLWLFV¶
(170) offers the lineaments of a blueprint for tribunality: the use of power to promote fairness, 
which may be done through courts, or through more overtly political institutions. Tribunality is 
an extension of politics, rather than a moral high ground floating somewhere above the earthly 
realm; war crimes trials proved worthwhile in the case of the Nazis precisely because of the 
existing legalistic tradition of German jurisprudence.´18 Law and politics thus form part of what 
ZHPLJKWWHUPDIWHU6KNODUWKH³WULEXQDOLW\FRQWLQXXP.´This means that complex political 
problems can best be addressed by the considered use of tribunality, rather than by merely 
legalistic solutions. Nuremburg, in her view, showed how tribunality can use power to promote 
fairness. Yet Shklar warned that international courts can work only in certain cultural and 
geopolitical circumstances. The Nazi war-crimes trials proved worthwhile precisely because of 
the existing tradition of German jurisprudence. The Tokyo trials, by contrast, ³achieved nothing 
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whatever.´ In short, ³one could justify the Nuremburg trials only on political grounds, and the 
Tokyo ones not at all.´19 
While the U.S. occupation of Japan achieved much success GHVSLWHWKH7RN\RWULEXQDOV¶
failure, this success was not juridical. It was political. A defeated aggressor was brought back 
into the family of nations, with new-minted or remodeled institutions that remain largely 
unchanged seven decades later. The Constitution of 1947, written by General Douglas 
0DF$UWKXU¶s staff, has yet to be amended. In large measure, the enduring character of the 
occupation-era reforms reflects the Japanese SHRSOH¶VVHQVHthat they are relatively fair.  
The transitional-justice industry does not, as a rule, pay much attention to the messy 
particularities of history. Instead, it seeks to generalize an approach that is only likely to work 
under tightly circumscribed conditions. Moral grounds, never political ones, are used to justify 
all transitional-justice interventions. What should be done in cases such as Cambodia or Rwanda,  
where tens of thousands of perpetrators may have killed hundreds of thousands of victims? Are 
criminal proceedings a useful response to such terrible events? Would convicting some 
perpetrators amount to a form of justice? Does such justice serve the purposes RI³WUDQVLWLRQ´"
Does it support moves toward a more open and liberal-democratic political order?  
7KHORJLFDOFRQFOXVLRQIURP6KNODU¶VDQDO\VLVLVWKDWWKHZRUOGQHHGVOHVVWUDQVLWLRQDO
justice, and more use of judicious tribunality. In order to right wrongs, to punish the cruel, and to 
secure some tentative gains for liberalism²albeit 6KNODU¶V ever-watchful ³liberalism of fear´²
real politics and not some putatively suprapolitical legalism must openly take center-stage. 
As the case of Cambodia illustrates, the notion of transitional justice is based on an implicit 
moral hierarchy, with ³justice´ at the top, politics below, and security measures at the bottom. 
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7KLVPLJKWEHVXPPDUL]HGDV³Justice: Try Khmer Rouge leaders. Politics: Craft a democratic 
polity. Security: 5HPRYH.KPHU5RXJHIURPSRZHU´  
Note that the last item on the list must be the first to happen on the ground. The Khmer 
Rouge were toppled from power in January 1979, but this has not become an action imbued with 
much prestige or importance. That is mostly because it was carried out by the army of 
communist Vietnam, an adversary of the United States and the pro-Western regional grouping, 
ASEAN. The recrafting of the Cambodian polity by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(or UNTAC, 1992±93), based upon a long process of peace talks, has by contrast been seen as an 
important moral mission of the international community and a prototype for UN-brokered 
political transitions since. Yet simply installing some form of elected government in Cambodia 
was insufficient to complete this moral project: At least partly because of Western guilt at having 
failed to act against the murderous Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s, there were persistent 
demands for an international tribunal to prosecute its leading figures. 
I am not suggesting that those responsible for mass murder should go unpunished, but 
only noting that the pressing of criminal charges in such a situation will inevitably run into 
moral, political, and practical problems. Up to two-million people were killed in Cambodia 
between April 1975 and January 1979± almost a quarter RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRSXODWLRQ20 The 
number of perpetrators was huge as well, and some perpetrators had become victims. The first 
trial was that of Khaing Guek Eav (better known as Duch), the commandant of the S-21 
detention and interrogation center. This former school became the place where Khmer Rouge 
cadres were locked up once the paranoid movement began to turn on its own. Many of the 
thousands who were held in unspeakable conditions, tortured, and executed at S-21 had 
themselves taken part in the torture or execution of others. Indeed, many guards at S-21 met the 
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same fate as those whom they had interrogated. The distinction between victims and perpetrators 
was not just blurred, it was often nonexistent.  
Much of the motivation for the Khmer Rouge tribunal is political. There is collective 
international regret that UNTAC came and went without loosening the authoritarian grip of 
Prime Minister Hun Sen and his &DPERGLDQ3HRSOH¶V3DUW\&33ZKLFKKDVbeen in power 
since 1979. The tribunal represents an implicit attempt to destabilize Hun Sen and promote 
regime change, in keeping with the longstanding Western desire IRUD³QRQFRPPXnist 
RSSRVLWLRQ´WKDWFDQ transform Cambodia for the better.21 The problem with this game is that two 
can play. While donors to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) may 
privately hope to delegitimize Hun Sen E\WDNLQJRQ&DPERGLD¶V³FXOWXUHRILPSXQLW\,´ the 
premier and his aides skillfully point to the trials to highlight their own pet themes. They love to 
dwell on how their government freed Cambodians from the killing fields, and has since rebuilt 
the country ³from scratch.´ If tKHVRXUFHRI&DPERGLD¶VSUREOHPVOLHVLQWKH.KPHU5RXJHSDVW, 
they are in effect saying, then the solution to them lies with Hun Sen and the CPP.  
,IDVORRNVH[WUHPHO\SUREDEOH+XQ6HQ¶VJRYHUQPHQWwill be able to bar any suspects 
beyond the original five from being indicted, then liberal ideals of global justice will have taken 
a hard hit. The Khmer Rouge tribunal may then stand exposed as a high-water mark, showing 
where the real-world effectiveness (if not the lingering popularity) of the transitional-justice 
trend began to recede. Some of the WULEXQDO¶Vproblems have been procedural and technical, but 
the basic shortcoming has been the inability of the UN and major donors such as Japan, 
Australia, the United States and Germany to resist the CPP regime¶s endless game-playing. In 
truth, a fully Cambodian court with UN technical support would have been a more viable option 
± DOEHLWPRUHWUDQVSDUHQWO\XQGHU+XQ6HQ¶VFRQWURO.22 7KH(&&&KDVEHHQWHUPHGDµEODFN
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VKHHS¶DPRQJ81-backed tribunals,23 but that does not let ³hybrid´ justice off the hook: The 
problems of the Cambodian case, like others at the ³margins of normality´ are simply more 
visible than those elsewhere.  
Prosecuting Heads of State 
Take the more straightforward case of an elected leader who apparently abuses her authority. In 
an electoral democracy, should the voters decide her fate at the next ballot? Or should she face 
impeachment and formal removal from office by a constitutional, political process? Or street 
protests and demands for resignation? Or should she be hauled up on domestic criminal charges, 
and possibly sentenced to jail? In the twenty-first century, recourse to judicial measures to 
address all manner of abuses of power has become a kneejerk reaction, one which testifies to the 
inexorable rise of legalism. Ellen Lutz and Caitlin Reiger cite 6KNODU¶VFULWLFLVPRISROLWLFDOWULDOV
as legal proceedings in which powerful actors seek to eliminate their political enemies, but then 
argue that such cases are now in the minority.24 They distinguish, in effect, between ³bad´ 
political trials, in which politics gains the upper hand over justice, and ³good´ political trials, 
which reflect a desire for public accountability. But the distinction may not always be so clear. 
But the distinction is not as straightforward as this narrative suggests. Lutz takes as her starting 
point a campaign to pursue former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos through the courts on 
corruption charges. Yet parallel campaigns to indict another Philippine president, Joseph Estrada, 
were hijacked by his political opponents:  In countries where corruption is ubiquitous, just about 
anyone who has ever held public office can be hit with corruption charges. Under such 
conditions, too much legalism may bring not greater order, but deadlock or even chaos. 
However superficially attractive it may seem, criminalizing political leaders for their bad 
behavior or questionable decisions risks devaluing or undermining the political process. This 
tendency has assumed an extreme form in Thailand, where no fewer than three prime ministers 
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were judicially ousted between 2008 and 2014, spawning strife, instability, and a military coup. 
Samak Sundaravej, was thrown out in 2008 on a technicality for having hosted a televised 
cooking show²an example of legalism gone mad. There are times when invoking judicial 
mechanisms in order to bring down a controversial figure or resolve a political contention may 
backfire and rouse rather than settle passions. 
 
Truth Commissions 
 
Although the transitional-justice industry is best known for the ICC and other criminal 
tribunals, the exponential growth of truth commissions has been a parallel development over the 
past two decades. A classic truth commission belongs to the time after a transition away from 
authoritarianism has occurred, when a more open political order is being built. The task is to 
investigate (but not prosecute) the misdeeds of the old, unfree regime. Truth commissions 
typically seek to make an accurate public record of the past, to give victims some sense of 
DFNQRZOHGJPHQWDQG³FORVXUH´WR³QDPHDQGVKDPH´EXWQRWMDLORUILQH perpetrators, to 
promote society-wide reflection and reconciliation, and to suggest partial remedies such as 
reparations for documented victims.25 In some cases, truth commissions are a second-best 
recourse for those cases where there are too many perpetrators to try, or where putting former 
regime officials in the dock might be too explosive. But increasingly, such commissions are 
promoted as morally desirable projects in their own right, unrelated to questions of criminal 
prosecution. 
Much as the shadow of Nuremburg looms over the ICC and other hybrid courts, the 
South African TRC is the model for truth commissions. It had various quasi-judicial features 
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including extensive witness hearings, and it was empowered to issue amnesties. Most of the 
scholarly attention paid to truth commissions has gone to what Patricia Hayner terms ³strong´ 
versions of them (her use of ³strong´ versus ³weak,´ we should note, allows her to avoid harder 
discussions about ³successful´ versus ³failed´). In the strong category she places not only the 
South African TRC, but commissions in Guatemala, Morocco, Peru, and Timor Leste.26 Strong 
commissions typically combine a potent sense of purpose with extensive public engagement, and 
come up with well-crafted recommendations that are broadly well-received.  
Hayner has offered a checklist of desirable features for strong commissions, including a 
wide mandate, investigative powers, a term of two to three years, a sizeable budget, and a staff 
numbering at least a hundred people.27 Other assets for commissions include a sharply defined 
time period to examine, considerable public buy-in, sympathetic media coverage, strong 
domestic and international political support, and lack of national-government interference. Of the 
more than forty truth commissions that have been created to date, only a small share have met 
+D\QHU¶Vtechnical criteria for strength. But we need to work with a much broader set of 
accountability criteria: To what extent did these commissions bring about genuine forms of 
scrutiny? How far did they lay the groundwork for appropriate sanctions? Most commissions are 
flawed, many are weak, and some border on outright dysfunction. The prospect of finding fault 
with an enterprise that holds up as its guiding ideals such universally praised concepts as justice, 
truth, and reconciliation does not appear to be an appetizing one in many eyes. Hence the 
stealthy mushrooming of second- and third-rate truth commissions has drawn remarkably little 
critical scrutiny. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume (even if we doubt this to be the case) that the rare 
³strong´ commissions are relatively unproblematic. We must still ask: Is there any evidence that 
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weak commissions do any good? Could some of them actually prove harmful, by stirring up dark 
memories, exacerbating conflicts, destabilizing regimes, or even generating fresh rounds of 
violence? In short, can one say that any truth commission is always better than no truth 
commission? 
A brief discussion of two failed Thai inquiries may help to illustrate some of the 
problems faced by truth commissions. In 2005, the Thai government established a National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) to examine the resurgence of separatist violence in the 
FRXQWU\¶V0XVOLP-majority southern provinces. It was chaired by distinguished former prime 
minister Anand Panyarachun.28 After commissioning an impressive series of research projects, 
the NRC put out in mid-2006 a 132-page final report that contained many airy references to 
justice, but no serious discussion of either the perpetrators of violence or the underlying 
questions of governance and representation facing the country. This anodyne document swiftly 
sank without a trace while the premier who had commissioned it, Thaksin Shinawatra, was 
ousted in a September 2006 military coup. In the 2011 edition of her standard book on truth 
commissions, Hayner does not even mention the NRC.  
/LNHPDQ\VXFKERGLHV7KDLODQG¶V15&ZDVQRWLQWHQGHGVLPSO\WRSURPRWHWUXWKRU
reconciliation. Rather, it was a political project initially designed to deflect attention from 
7KDNVLQ¶VERWFKHGKDQGOLng of the southern conflict. 6RRQHQRXJKKRZHYHUWKHFRPPLVVLRQ¶V
proceedings became a focus for opposition to the Thaksin government led by a group of liberal 
royalists, and so helped create the conditions for the coup. The southern conflict was not a 
transitional-justice problem; it was a political problem, in need of a political solution.  
Much the same was true of the Thai Truth for Reconciliation Commission mentioned at 
the outset of this essay. By far the greatest number of those killed in the 2010 violence had been 
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pro-Thaksin civilian protestors shot by the militaryEXWWKHFRPPLVVLRQ¶V report blamed mainly 
the demonstrators.29 Leading commission members were known allies of the anti-Thaksin 
movement, and their report studiously avoided talking about the longstanding policy of impunity 
for state officials that allows the Royal Thai Army to be so free in its use of force. This 
unwillingness to criticize the military helped to create the conditions for yet another coup, this 
time in May 2014. As window-dressing, the commission even invited Hayner and other 
transitional-justice luminaries to visit Bangkok. The commission deployed the rhetoric of 
transitional justice despite a patent lack of the powers, resources, or political support that a 
strong truth commission requires.  
These two Thai cases illustrate a disturbing trend: the rise of half-baked truth 
commissions that ³WDONWKHWDON´RIWUDQsitional justice to disguise serious shortcomings. For more 
than a century, commissions of inquiry have investigated matters of grave public concern 
without overdoing claims regarding justice and truth. Outstanding examples in the English-
speaking world include the two inquiries into the sinking of the Titanic, the Warren Commission, 
and the Franks Commission on the Falklands War. All had their shortcomings, but at least none 
came cloaked in the specious moralism of many recent transitional-justice exercises. For the 
most part, we need more (and better) public inquiries, and fewer truth commissions.  
Transitional Justice and History  
 
 In Postwar, his magisterial survey of Europe since 1945, Tony Judt argues that 
institutional efforts to expose past injustices (such as the construction of Holocaust memorials 
and museums) proved less important than the fostering of regular historical inquiry. Such history 
can contribute to disenchantment and disruption, and as Judt ZDUQHG³it is not always politically 
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prudent to wield the past as a moral cudgel with which to beat and berate a people for its past 
sins´<HWeven EHDULQJWKLVLQPLQGKHVWLOOEHOLHYHGWKDWWKHKLVWRULDQ¶V³rigorous investigation 
DQGLQWHUURJDWLRQ´ of the past remained of central importance.30  
The relationship between transitional justice and history is a complex one. The Khmer 
Rouge tribunal, for example, cannot function without research and evidence provided by 
professional historians. Yet international tribunals are concerned with securing legal outcomes 
and not with exploring messy historical debates. As such, they may easily become moral cudgels 
of exactly the kind that Judt warns against. Catalyzing public discussion about the Khmer Rouge 
period was arguably one of the &DPERGLDWULEXQDO¶V greatest contributions, but was ³only 
tangentially related to its mandate.´31 Would funding and disseminating high-quality historical 
studies of the Khmer Rouge era have accomplished more than holding trials?  
The 1983±84 Argentinian National Commission on Disappeared People (CONADEP), 
which pre-dated the South African TRC, was too much like a classic presidential commission of 
³the great and the good´ to satisfy most transitional-justice specialists. Yet in under a year 
CONADEP produced the Nunca Más (Never Again) report, which became a best-seller and has 
shaped subsequent historical memories and understandings of the thousands of ³disappearances´
and other rights violations committed by the military dictatorship that ruled Argentina from 1976 
to 1983&21$'(3¶VVXFFHVVHVZHUHEDVHGRQVWURQJSROLWLFDOZLOl and widespread popular 
support, while Nunca Más was crafted by Commission president Ernesto Sabato, a brilliant 
novelist, who included poignant verbatim quotations from witness statements on virtually every 
page.32 
 The recent flounderings of the ICC, the manifest shortcomings of the Khmer Rouge 
tribunal and other ad hoc international or hybrid courts, the proliferation of mixed-quality truth 
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commissions²all illustrate the failures of global legalism and undermine the claims to moral 
superiority that underpin the transitional-justice industry. It is time to curb our well-intentioned 
celebratory impulses and recognize that, just as earlier waves of democratic transitions are now 
faltering, so has transitional justice passed its peak.  
Redressing matters will involve acknowledging that transitional justice is ultimately 
politics in the guise of legalism, and that the problems of postconflict and posttransition societies 
are essentially political ones. It is time to desist from the impulse to laud every transitional-
justice initiative  and instead carefully assess what seems viable, realistic, and unlikely to do 
further harm . Law does not exist on a higher moral plane above politics, but is simply part of a 
continuum of solutions. Let us instead GXVWRII6KNODU¶Vtoo-long-neglected idea that 
representative assemblies (including parliamentary committees) or even benevolent 
bureaucracies can perform much of the work that transitional justice assigns to trial chambers 
and truth commissions: justice can best be achieved through the appropriate use of political 
power to promote fairness, what Shklar terms tribunality Solutions to complex political problems 
need to be more creative, sometimes deploying legal mechanisms, but never in purely legalistic 
ways. By and large, the international community should get out of the business of putting people 
on trial. Let fact-finding go forward, by all means, but do not lard it with overreaching talk of 
³truth and reconciliation.´ Above all, we need good historical research into deadly conflicts, in 
accessible formats, widely disseminated and debated in the very places where the violence has 
taken place. The goals of accounting for the past and of preventing future mass violence are 
shared by all: the only question is how best to pursue these noble ideas. 
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